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Auditory Distraction: A Duplex-Mechanism Account 
 
 
Abstract 
A body of laboratory work is reviewed suggesting that auditory distraction comes in two 
functionally distinct forms. Interference-by-process is produced when the involuntary processing 
of the sound competes for a similar process applied deliberately to perform a focal task. In 
contrast, attentional capture is produced when the sound causes a disengagement of attention away 
from the prevailing task, regardless of the task processes involved. Particular attention is devoted 
to reviewing a range of converging evidence from both experimental and individual- and group-
differences based research indicating  that auditory attentional capture is controllable via greater 
top-down task-engagement whereas interference-by-process is not.     
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 One of the biggest challenges of day-to-day life is staying focused on the subset of 
incoming sensations relevant to an immediate goal (e.g., the pattern of light produced by the 
words on this page) whilst ignoring irrelevant information (someone chatting outside in the 
corridor). However, a key paradox is that this need to remain focused is coupled with a 
simultaneous need to continue processing the ‘irrelevant’ information so that our attention can be 
readily switched to it if our immediate goals change or if there are marked changes in the 
environment itself that might signal events that need to be acted upon swiftly (e.g., the chatty 
person in the corridor suddenly shouting ‘fire!’). In turn, a cost of this essential openness to task-
irrelevant stimuli is unwanted distraction: Focal mental processing is at the mercy of disruption by 
stimuli that do not necessarily require a response. Both the openness of the cognitive system and 
the concomitant potential cost of unwanted distraction is particularly apparent in relation to 
auditory stimuli because our ears cannot be easily shut or averted to avoid registering sound 
(unlike the eyes in relation to light) and we register sound even in darkness and from all directions 
(again, unlike the case for vision). The goal of the present paper is to review evidence derived 
mainly from laboratory studies of the disruption by sound of simple short-term memory tasks for a 
duplex-mechanism account of auditory distraction: Sound can cause unwanted distraction either 
by interfering specifically with the processes involved in the focal task (interference-by-process) 
or by diverting attention away from a focal task regardless of the type of processing that task 
involves (attentional capture). Interest will centre in particular on reviewing recently emerging 
evidence suggesting that whereas attentional capture can be controlled through greater 
engagement in focal task-processing, the other cannot.  
Auditory Distraction Type I: Interference-by-Process 
It has long been argued that one mechanism by which task-irrelevant sound disrupts 
cognitive task performance is by interfering with the particular processes involved in the 
given focal task (e.g., Jones & Macken, 1993). The action of this distraction mechanism has 
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been demonstrated mainly in the context of short-term serial recall in which, typically, 
participants are asked to recall in order a list of around six to eight verbal items (e.g., digits, 
letters) presented one by one on a screen at the rate of approximately one or two items per 
second. Serial recall is impaired appreciably by the mere presence of sound, whether that 
sound is presented during the presentation of the to-be-remembered items or during a short 
retention interval between the last to-be-remembered item and a recall cue (Colle & Welsh, 
1976; Ellermeier & Zimmer, 1997; Elliott, 2002; Neath, 2000; Röer, Bell, Dentale, & 
Buchner, 2011; Salamé & Baddeley, 1982; Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1990). This is the case 
despite the fact participants are explicitly told to ignore the sound and that they will never be 
tested on its contents. A key signature of the disruption as far as the sound is concerned is 
that, for marked and consistently reliable disruption, it must be changing acoustically from 
one perceptually segmentable entity to the next. Thus, a sequence such as “B, Q, J, G...” or 
“B, Q, B, Q…”, or a succession of tones in which each differs in frequency from the last, 
produces marked disruption whereas a steady-state item (“B, B, B, B...”; or a repeating tone) 
produces little if any disruption compared to quiet (e.g., Divin, Coyle, & James, 2001; 
Hughes, Tremblay, & Jones, 2005; Jones & Macken, 1993). In contrast, other, non-acoustic, 
properties of sound such as phonology or meaning (when speech is used) play a relatively 
minor, if any, role in the disruption of serial recall (e.g., Buchner, Irmen, & Erdfelder, 1996; 
Jones & Macken, 1995a; Jones et al., 1990; Marsh, Hughes, & Jones, 2008). 
A large body of work suggests that this changing-state effect is an example of 
auditory distraction caused by interference-by-process: the distraction is a joint product of 
processes being applied in an involuntary fashion to the sound and the nature of the focal 
serial short-term memory task (e.g., Jones & Macken, 1993; Jones et al., 1999; Macken et al., 
2009). Specifically, it is assumed that the changes from one successive sound element to the 
next give rise to cues pertaining to the order of the sounds. This extraneous order information 
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interferes specifically with the deliberate, goal-driven, process of rehearsing the to-be-
remembered items in serial order in support of their eventual sequential output (see, e.g., 
Jones & Macken, 1993; this volume).  
Whilst the changing-state effect in serial recall will be used as the key example of 
distraction through interference-by-process in this review, it is important to note that this 
form of distraction can be witnessed also in other task-settings. Most notably, an interference-
by-process analysis has been applied to auditory distraction in the context of several settings 
in which focal semantic processing is a dominant feature, in contrast to the articulatory-based 
serial processing that dominates serial recall of relatively meaningless items such as digits or 
letters (e.g., Jones, Marsh, & Hughes, 2012; Marsh, Hughes, & Jones, 2008, 2009; Marsh, 
Beaman, Hughes, & Jones, 2012). For instance, if the task involves the free recall of a list of 
words from a single semantic category (e.g., apple, pear, strawberry… ), it is now the 
semantic rather than acoustic features of task-irrelevant speech that assume disruptive 
potency. Thus, irrelevant speech that is semantically related to the to-be-remembered words 
(e.g., orange, peach, banana…)—compared to unrelated speech (e.g., eagle, sparrow…)—is 
particularly disruptive in this task-setting (Marsh et al., 2008). Similarly, in a semantic 
fluency task in which participants are asked to generate as many words as they can from a 
given semantic category (e.g., fruit), irrelevant spoken words drawn from a semantically-
related category (vegetables) are more disruptive to performance than words drawn from an 
unrelated category (e.g., furniture; Jones et al., 2012). Within the interference-by-process 
approach, such semantic distraction effects can be explained by supposing that semantically 
similar speech causes automatic spreading of activation through a long-term semantic 
network which interferes with the similar process of navigating such networks for the 
purpose of retrieval in the focal task (for further discussion, see Marsh & Jones, 2010).   
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Auditory Distraction Type II: Attentional Capture 
The second mechanism of auditory distraction within the duplex-mechanism account 
is attentional capture whereby attention is at least momentarily disengaged from the focal 
task, regardless of the particular processing involved in that task (e.g., Escera, Alho, Winkler, 
& Näätänen, 1998;  Hughes, Vachon, & Jones, 2005; Lange, 2005; Parmentier, Elford, 
Escera, Andrés, & San Miguel, 2008; Sörqvist, 2010; Vachon, Hughes, & Jones, 2012). 
Attentional capture can, in turn, be divided into two classes (Eimer, Nattkemper, Schröger, & 
Prinz, 1996):  Specific attentional capture occurs when it is the particular content of the sound 
that endows it with attention-diverting power such as when one hears their own name being 
called (e.g., Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001; Moray, 1959; Röer, Bell, & Buchner, 2013; 
Wood & Cowan, 1995) or sound that is otherwise meaningful or of interest to a given 
individual (e.g., a mother hearing her own baby’s cries; the sound of cooking for a hungry 
person).  Aspecific attentional capture is produced when there is nothing inherent in the event 
itself that is attention-capturing; rather, it captures attention because of the context in which it 
occurs. Thus, if a sound (A) of a particular frequency (Hz) is presented following a 
succession of sounds of a different frequency—BBBBBABB—A will tend to capture attention 
because it violates the expectation for another B. But this has nothing to do with the 
properties of A per se; B would tend to capture attention in the sequence AAAAABAA (e.g., 
Escera, Alho, Winkler, & Näätänen, 1998; Hughes et al., 2005; Hughes, Vachon, & Jones; 
2007; Näätänen, 1990; Parmentier, 2008; Schröger & Wolff, 1998). That an auditory 
deviation captures attention is indicated by the fact that when presented as part of a task-
irrelevant sequence of sounds, it disrupts performance of a range of focal cognitive tasks 
(e.g., Hughes et al., 2007; Parmentier et al., 2008; Schröger & Wolff, 1998; see also next sub-
section).  
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Of particular relevance for present purposes is that auditory deviations disrupt serial 
recall performance. For example, if, on a relatively small number of trials, a word spoken in a 
male voice is embedded in a task-irrelevant sequence of female-spoken words (or vice versa), 
serial recall is impaired appreciably (Hughes et al., 2007, 2013). On the grounds of 
parsimony alone, it would be tempting to assume that this deviation effect and the changing-
state effect on serial recall performance are instances of the same phenomenon. However, the 
distinction at the heart of the duplex-mechanism account—that between interference-by-
process and attentional capture—has, in part, been based on various functional dissociations 
between the impact of an auditory deviation and the changing-state effect. The first of these 
to be considered here relates to the different role played by the qualitative nature of the focal 
task in the two forms of auditory distraction.  
Differential Task-Sensitivity  
 The interference-by-process view of the changing-state effect posits that changing- 
compared to steady-state sound specifically disrupts serial rehearsal, that is, this form of 
distraction is task-process sensitive. Evidence for this form of distraction within the serial 
recall setting comes from the finding that if the involvement of serial rehearsal is reduced by 
asking participants to engage in articulatory suppression (repeated articulation of an 
irrelevant verbal sequence during the task), the changing-state effect disappears (Jones, 
Macken, & Nicholls, 2004; see also Hanley, 1997; Salamé & Baddeley, 1982). Furthermore, 
if the locus of the sound-sequence is manipulated such that it accompanies a point in the 
serial recall task in which the demand on rehearsal processes is relatively low (e.g., as the 
first few to-be-remembered items are presented), changing-state sound is less disruptive than 
if it accompanies a point in which rehearsal demand is relatively high (e.g., late during list 
presentation; Macken, Mosdell, & Jones, 1999). Another line of evidence for the task-process 
sensitivity of the changing-state effect comes from studies that have examined whether 
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changing-state sound is also disruptive of tasks that are assumed not to invoke a serial 
rehearsal strategy (Beaman & Jones, 1997; Hughes et al., 2007; Jones & Macken, 1993). 
Take, for example, the missing-item task which shares most of its characteristics with serial 
recall—the nature of the to-be-remembered items, their rate of presentation, and list length—
but the list is made up of a set from which one member is missing (e.g., eight of the nine 
digits from the set 1-9 presented in random order). Rather than recall the items in order (serial 
recall), the task here is to report the missing item (e.g., Buschke, 1963). This short-term 
memory task does not require the order of the items to be retained and serial rehearsal does 
not seem to be adopted as a strategy to perform the task (as evidenced by the fact that it is 
relatively immune to the impact of articulatory suppression; Klapp, Marshburn, & Lester, 
1983). In line with the interference-by-process account, the missing-item task is not disrupted 
by changing- compared to steady-state sound (e.g., Hughes et al., 2007; Jones & Macken, 
1993).  
 In contrast, attentional capture does not appear to be task-process sensitive so long as 
the task is attention-demanding (i.e., the task must not be automatized to the extent that it is 
immune to any form of interference; cf. Neumann, 1987). Certainly, serial rehearsal is not 
peculiarly vulnerable to attentional capture as appears to be the case with the changing-state 
effect. For example, specific attentional capture by one’s own name is found in a task 
involving the shadowing of a speech sequence which is unlikely to place a heavy burden on 
serial rehearsal (Wood & Cowan, 1995). Aspecific attentional capture by an auditory 
deviation has also been reported in the context of a wide range of focal tasks including the 
speeded classification of visually presented digits (as odd or even; Parmentier et al., 2008) or 
of the duration of each of a succession of tones (e.g., Schröger & Wolff, 1998). Perhaps the 
most direct evidence for a distinction between interference-by-process and attentional capture 
in terms of differential task-sensitivity, however, comes from the finding that whilst the 
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missing-item task is immune to a changing-state effect, it is indeed disrupted appreciably by a 
deviant (Hughes et al., 2007). This dissociation also helps to counter the possible objection 
that missing-item performance may not be susceptible to a changing-state effect because such 
performance is insensitive to any form of disruption by task-irrelevant sounds.  
It should be noted that whilst the duplex-mechanism account posits that there are 
fundamental differences between the changing-state effect and aspecific attentional capture, 
they may both ultimately be the result of sequential auditory streaming. This is the process 
whereby the auditory system integrates successive sounds that have derived from the same 
environmental source into the same temporally-extended perceptual object (or ‘stream’) or, 
alternatively, partitions successive events from different sources into separate streams. In the 
case of the changing-state effect, there is evidence that it is the integration of stimuli that are 
changing but that are nevertheless similar enough to be integrated into a single stream that 
yields order cues that then interfere with serial recall (e.g., different words but all spoken in 
the same voice; see Jones & Macken, 1995a; Jones, Alford, Bridges, Tremblay, & Macken, 
1999). In contrast, registering an event as a deviation may correspond to the perception of a 
change that is sufficiently large to be perceived as the onset of a new environmental event 
and hence one that warrants an interruption of focal processing so that its possible 
significance can be evaluated (e.g., Sussman et al., 2007). Whilst Macken & Jones (this 
volume) discuss this shared antecedent of the changing-state effect and the deviation effect in 
some detail, the current review focuses on evidence suggesting that there is a fundamental 
difference in the manner in which they disrupt task-performance.  
Differential Cognitive Control  
There has been a great deal of interest in recent years in the extent to which 
distraction (both visual and auditory) is not merely a function of the properties of the 
distracting material itself (‘bottom-up’ factors) but also factors internal to the individual 
Duplex-mechanism account of auditory distraction    10 
 
(‘top-down’ factors; e.g., Monsell & Driver, 2001). For example, it has been argued that one 
way in which top-down cognitive control may be exercised is through the boosted activation 
of representations pertaining to the focal task including a preparatory task-set, the panoply of 
representations preactivated in preparation for optimal performance of any goal-driven task 
such as the task-goal, rules and strategies for meeting that goal, and probable upcoming 
stimuli (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Engle, 2002; MacLeod et al., 2003). Of particular 
interest here is the commonly held view that there exists not only inter-person variation in the 
overall capacity for cognitive control through increased task-engagement (e.g., Engle, 2002) 
but also intra-individual variation over time which can be influenced by a range of factors 
including task-demands, emotional state, and motivational factors (Matthews et al., 2002). 
Evidence from various task-settings suggests that whilst interference-by-process cannot be 
brought under cognitive control via an increased task-engagement, (some) individuals are 
indeed able to exert such cognitive control over distraction due to auditory attentional 
capture. This evidence comes from experimental findings pertaining to the influence of 
various forms of task-demand, the effects of foreknowledge of potential distraction, and 
individual differences in susceptibility to auditory distraction both within adults and across 
different developmental populations. 
The Influence of Task-Demand 
One line of experimental evidence that greater task-engagement shields against 
auditory attentional capture but not interference-by-process is that promoting greater task-
engagement by making the focal task more demanding reduces or eliminates the disruptive 
impact of a deviant sound but not the changing-state effect. For example, in Hughes et al. 
(2013), the difficulty of a serial recall task was increased by embedding the to-be-
remembered items in static visual noise. Separate studies had established that it takes longer 
to identify stimuli degraded in this way but that accuracy remains high (Hughes et al., 2013; 
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Parmentier et al., 2008). It was found that whilst high encoding-difficulty did not directly 
affect serial recall performance, it eliminated the marked disruption of serial recall by an 
auditory deviant. It did not, however, influence the changing-state effect: interference-by-
process seems to be immune to the same perceptual degradation manipulation that attenuates 
attentional capture. This can be explained by supposing that high encoding-difficulty does not 
necessarily affect the extent to which the to-be-remembered items—so long as they can be 
encoded accurately—are rehearsed; hence, the key precondition for the changing-state effect 
as far as focal-task processing is concerned remains. Indeed, the fact that high encoding-
difficulty did not impair serial recall directly is consistent with the notion that rehearsal was 
not affected to any appreciable extent. 
The distraction-shielding effect of increased visual encoding-difficulty extends to a 
variety of manipulations of encoding-difficulty, to different cognitive tasks, and to properties 
of sound other than deviations: For example, proof-reading a text presented in a difficult-to-
encode font (Haettenschweil) is appreciably less susceptible to distraction from irrelevant 
meaningful speech (compared to quiet) than proof-reading the same text presented in a 
relatively easy-to-encode font (Times New Roman; Halin, Marsh, Haga, Holmgren, & 
Sörqvist, 2013). A comparable effect is observed when memory for the text is tested (Halin, 
Marsh, & Sörqvist, personal communication). Finally, Marsh, Sörqvist, and Hughes (2013) 
have shown that irrelevant spoken words semantically related to a list of words presented for 
free recall is less likely to disrupt recall and intrudes less into participants’ responses if the 
words are presented in static visual noise (cf. Hughes et al., 2013). One theoretical 
implication of this work from the standpoint of the duplex-mechanism account is that at least 
some of the disruptive effect of semantically similar speech on semantic-based cognitive 
tasks (e.g., Bell, Buchner, & Mund, 2008; Marsh et al., 2008) may be due to (a specific form 
of) attentional capture (cf. Eimer et al., 1996).  
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On the face of it, it might be argued that rather than eliciting a top-down cognitive 
response (increased task-engagement), high encoding-difficulty may instead be a passive, 
bottom-up, consequence of high ‘perceptual load’ (Lavie, 1995, 2005; Lavie & Tsal, 1994). 
In many studies of visual attention, Lavie and colleagues have shown that making perceptual 
identification of a visual target more demanding by, for example, embedding it amongst 
other, non-target, stimuli, distraction from visual distractors presented outside the target-area 
is attenuated.  This has been explained by supposing that “perception has limited capacity…. 
but processes all stimuli in an automatic fashion… until it runs out of capacity… [so that] 
high perceptual load that engages full capacity in relevant processing would leave no spare 
capacity for perception of task-irrelevant stimuli” (Lavie, 2005, p. 75). Within this 
perceptual-load based account, then, the effect of high encoding-difficulty on auditory 
attentional capture in serial recall could be (re)interpreted as a passive by-product of the 
depletion of an attentional resource dedicated to perceptual processing, not a top-down 
cognitive response to increased task-demands.  
There are several lines of converging evidence that support the top-down control 
account over the perceptual-load based account of the reduction of auditory attentional 
capture due to perceptual degradation. First, according to Lavie’s Load Theory—of which the 
perceptual load model is one part—sensory degradation of task-relevant stimuli does not in 
fact constitute an increase in perceptual load but rather sensory load (Lavie and De Fockert, 
2003). Given that, according to Load Theory, high sensory load increases rather than reduces 
distraction (Lavie and De Fockert, 2003), this alternative conceptualization of what we have 
called high encoding-difficulty runs into difficulties. Even if the definition of perceptual load 
was extended to include manipulations involving sensory degradation, the fact that it reduces 
the deviation effect but not the changing-state effect supports the top-down view: If the 
processing of a sound-sequence is filtered out early because perceptual degradation depletes a 
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limited perceptual resource, then it seems reasonable to expect that any form of distraction 
produced by that sound-sequence should be attenuated. However, as noted, disruption of 
serial recall due to interference-by-process (i.e., changing-state effect)  is not affected by 
perceptual degradation of the to-be-remembered items (Hughes et al., 2013). 
Yet further evidence against a perceptual load-based account of the effect of 
perceptual degradation comes from recent evidence that an increase in task-demand that does 
not involve altering bottom-up factors (unlike the perceptual degradation method) seems to 
exert the same influence on the deviation effect as high encoding-difficulty. For example, 
requiring participants to undertake a secondary cognitive load in the form of (whispered) 
concurrent articulation also eliminates the deviation effect (Hughes, Hurlstone, & Jones, 
2014). One possible explanation for this is that, like the changing-state effect, verbal 
rehearsal is particularly susceptible to the deviation effect and so concurrent articulation 
serves to strip the task of that aspect (verbal rehearsal) that renders it vulnerable (cf. Jones et 
al., 2004). However, the fact that the deviation effect is of comparable magnitude in tasks 
devoid of serial rehearsal (Hughes et al., 2007) suggests against this interpretation. Another 
possible explanation, therefore, is that rather than exerting its effect by blocking rehearsal, 
concurrent articulation in this case—as with high encoding-difficulty within the focal task 
(Hughes et al., 2013)—serves to increase the overall demand on processing that is unrelated 
to the sound and hence again shields against capture by a deviant within that sound.  
In seeking to adjudicate directly between these two accounts, Hughes et al. (2014) 
reasoned that if verbal rehearsal underpins the deviation effect, then increasing the load on 
rehearsal should exacerbate that effect just as it does the changing-state effect. If, however, 
any processing demand unrelated to the sound attenuates attentional capture by a deviant, 
then such capture should be reduced under increased rehearsal demand. Following Macken et 
al. (1999), the locus of the irrelevant sound-sequence was varied such as to accompany the 
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first few items in the list, the last few items, or during a retention interval between the last 
item and a recall cue. The key assumption is that the demand on rehearsal is relatively low 
early during list presentation but becomes heavier towards the end of the list and during a 
retention interval. Replicating Macken et al. (1999), the changing-state effect was 
accentuated under increased rehearsal demand. However, whereas a deviant disrupted 
performance when presented relatively early in list processing, its deleterious impact was 
reduced when presented late in the list or early during a retention interval (Hughes et al., 
2014). Thus, this not only provides a futher dissocation between the changing-state and 
deviation effects, it supports the view that any increase in goal-driven processing that is 
unrelated to the sound —whether ‘perceptual’ or ‘cognitive’—shields against attentional 
capture by sound. The pattern of results also suggests that the observation that a deviation 
effect is found during presentation but not during a retention interval does not necessarily 
imply that stimulus-encoding is peculiarly susceptible to this effect as first suggested (cf. 
Hughes et al., 2005); rather, it appears to be because task-engagement is greater during the 
retention interval (though see Röer, Bell, & Buchner, 2013). 
A broader implication of the apparent equivalence of increased perceptual and 
cognitive demands on attentional capture by an auditory deviant is that it challenges a 
fundamental distinction often made between these two types of mental demand. For example, 
according to Lavie (2005, p. 80), “load on executive control functions, such as working 
memory, that renders them unavailable to actively maintain stimulus-processing priorities 
throughout task performance has the opposite effect to perceptual load: it increases 
interference by irrelevant low-priority distractors rather than decreases it.” (Lavie 2005 p. 
80). And indeed, there is a good deal of support for this distinction in uni-visual distraction 
settings (e.g., De Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Lavie et al., 2004). However, assuming 
that engaging in a secondary activity (e.g., concurrent articulation) and increased demand on 
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rehearsal can be regarded as imposing higher demands on working memory (or ‘cognitive 
control’; see Lavie, 2005), the fact that these variables exert the same impact on the deviation 
effect as high encoding-difficulty (vis-à-vis ‘perceptual load’) seems to cast serious doubt 
upon the applicability of the distinction between perceptual and cognitive load to auditory 
distraction. 
Indeed, there are numerous other instances outside of the serial recall setting in which 
a supposed increase in cognitive load reduces rather than increases auditory distraction. For 
example, reaction time (RT) to discriminate the duration of each of a series of tones (long vs. 
short) is impaired to a lesser degree by a rare deviation in the frequency of a tone (n) when 
cognitive load is increased by requiring discrimination of the duration of tone n – 1 rather 
than tone n. (i.e., an ‘n-back’ task; Berti and Schröger, 2003). The same result is obtained 
when the to-be-classified stimulus is a visually presented stimulus that follows each sound 
[where the increase in WM load is again implemented using a one-back condition 
(SanMiguel, Corral, & Escera, 2008; SanMiguel, Linden, & Escera, 2010) or by increasing 
the number of response-alternatives (Parmentier et al., 2008)]. There are also event-related 
potential data suggesting that greater active-engagement shields against deviation effects: For 
example, Harmony et al. (2000) asked participants to re-order a series of five visually-
presented letters (e.g., ABTEL) into a word (TABLE) or to simply report the identity of a 
single repeated letter (e.g., AAAAA). In the latter condition, the authors found a P3a wave—
widely regarded as a neural marker of auditory attentional capture in response to the presence 
of a frequency-deviant tone. However, in the former condition the P3a was attenuated. 
Similarly, Muller-Gass, Stelmack, and Campbell (2006) found that the P3a elicited by a rare 
deviation in the intensity of background sounds was attenuated when the discriminability of 
task-relevant visual target stimuli was reduced and Zhang, Chen, Yuan, Zhang, and He 
(2006) also reported that the P3a response to an auditory deviant was attenuated when the 
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number of moving visual objects to be tracked was increased from one to three. Thus, further 
research is clearly required to determine why high cognitive load increases distraction in 
certain uni-visual settings (Lavie, 2005) but reduces auditory deviation effects (though see 
Benoni & Tsal, 2013, for doubts regarding the validity of the distinction even in the context 
of visual distraction).  
The Role of Expectations  
Further evidence that attentional capture (but not interference-by-process) is amenable 
to top-down cognitive control comes from the impact of providing a warning about potential 
distraction. For instance, Sussman, Winkler, and Schröger (2003) asked participants to judge 
the duration (short or long) of each of a succession of tones as quickly and as accurately as 
possible. A deviation in the frequency (Hz) of a tone captured attention as indexed by a delay 
in the response to its duration. This deviation effect was eliminated, however, if a visual 
warning was given about the imminent deviation (see also Horváth, Sussman, Winkler, & 
Schröger, 2011). A warning about potential distraction can also aid the resumption of a task 
following attentional capture by an auditory deviation: Shelton, Elliott, Eaves, and Exner 
(2009) found that performance of a visually presented lexical-decision task recovered more 
quickly from disruption by a mobile phone-ring presented against an otherwise quiet 
background if participants were warned that a phone-ring would be presented at some point 
during the task. The impact of an auditory deviant in the context of serial recall is also 
eliminated if, just before the critical trial, participants are told that an auditory deviation will 
occur (Hughes et al., 2013). Such effects of forewarning seem, like high encoding-difficulty, 
to be most readily explained in terms of greater task-engagement; presumably, the 
expectation for a potentially capturing sound is incorporated into the task-set in order to 
shield ongoing performance from intrusion by the deviation (see also Vachon et al., 2012).   
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In contrast to attentional capture, interference-by-process—at least as indexed by the 
changing-state effect on serial recall—is not modulated by top-down knowledge about the 
sound. For example, a changing-state sequence continues to disrupt serial recall appreciably 
even when participants encounter the same two alternating spoken words nearly 2000 times 
across many trials (Röer et al., 2011). Furthermore, when an explicit cue is provided that a 
changing-state as opposed to steady-state sequence is about to be presented, the disruptive 
impact of the former compared to the latter is unaltered (Hughes et al., 2013). 
Evidence From Individual Differences in Distractibility  
There is convergent psychometric evidence for the view that attentional capture by 
sound but not interference-by-process is amenable to top-down cognitive control. For 
example, it is well accepted that there are stable individual differences in “working memory 
capacity” (WMC) as measured by performance on complex span tasks such as reading span 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) and (arithmetic) operation span (Turner & Engle, 1989). 
Critical for present purposes is the commonly-made supposition that WMC is largely if not 
wholly equivalent to the capacity to exert top-down cognitive control, particularly in the face 
of potentially distracting influences (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Engle & 
Kane, 2004). In line with this view, individuals high in WMC are typically found to be less 
susceptible to distraction from task-irrelevant stimuli. For example, high-WMC individuals 
are less likely to be distracted by their own name presented to the to-be-ignored ear while 
shadowing prose presented to the other (Conway et al., 2001), less susceptible to distraction 
in the classic Stroop task (Kane & Engle, 2003), and less prone to false recall of 
semantically-related distracters in the context of auditory semantic distraction settings (e.g., 
Beaman, 2004). Such results are clearly consistent with the notion that individuals with high 
WMC are “better able to inhibit or suppress irrelevant information and to prevent it entering 
working memory” (Engle, 1996, p. 111). Of most relevance to the present argument, high 
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WMC individuals are less susceptible to the deviation effect (Hughes et al., 2013; Sörqvist, 
2010; Sörqvist et al., in press) but not to the changing-state effect (Beaman, 2004; Hughes et 
al., 2013; Elliott & Briganti, 2012; Elliott & Cowan, 2005; Sörqvist, 2010; Sörqvist, Marsh, 
& Nöstl, in press; see also Ellermeier & Zimmer, 1997; Macken, Phelps, & Jones, 2009; 
Neath, Farley, & Surprenant, 2003).  
An interesting parallel between the duplex-mechanism account of auditory distraction 
and the study of individual differences in WMC is the duality of the disruption found in the 
classic Stroop task in which participants must name the colour in which a colour-word (e.g., 
‘red’ written in blue) is printed (see MacLeod, 1991): It has been shown that low-WMC 
individuals are only more susceptible to the general goal-maintenance component of Stroop 
interference (to remember to name the color rather than read the word), a component indexed 
by the inadvertent reporting of the word (i.e., an intrusion error) or slower RTs on 
incongruent trials but only at the tail of the RT distribution (i.e., an increase in the number of 
very slow responses). There are not, in contrast, WMC-related individual differences in the 
task-process specific component of Stroop distraction, namely, that related to competition-
resolution (i.e., Stroop interference ‘proper’; e.g., Morey et al., 2012; Unsworth, Redick, 
Spillers, & Brewer, 2012; see also Keye, Wilhelm, Oberauer, & van Ravenzwaaij, 2009; 
Redick, Calvo, Gay, & Engle, 2011). Here again, then, general task-engagement appears to 
be under top-down cognitive control but not the influence of stimuli (or stimulus dimensions) 
that are incongruent with the particular demands of the focal task.  
Developmental Differences in Distractibility 
A further strand of support for the duplex-mechanism account is emerging from 
developmental studies of auditory distraction. It is well established that children (e.g., aged 8 
years) show more disruption by irrelevant speech of serial recall than young adults (Elliott, 
2002; Elliott & Briganti, 2012). Recent evidence suggests that this increased susceptibility 
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may be specifically attributable to increased susceptibility to attentional capture, not 
interference-by-process (Elliott, Hughes, Briganti, & Macken, 2013; see also Klatte, 
Lachmann, Schlittmeier, & Hellbruck, 2010). Elliott et al. (2013) examined children and 
adults’ performance of two tasks in the presence of irrelevant speech. One task—the probed 
order task—was similar to serial recall except that at test one of the to-be-remembered items 
was (re)presented and the task was to recall which item followed it in the list (e.g., Murdock, 
1968). Thus, performance of this task, like serial recall, should show a changing-state effect. 
The second task was the missing-item task described earlier which is devoid of the need for 
serial rehearsal and, accordingly, is immune to the changing-state effect (e.g., Hughes et al., 
2007; Jones & Macken, 1993). The results showed the expected pattern for adults: They 
exhibited a changing-state effect in the probe task but not in the missing-item task. However, 
the novel aspect of the results was the distinct pattern found in the children: Whilst they 
showed a changing-state effect in the probe task and none in the missing-item task (as with 
adults), the largest distraction effect for children was found in the contrast between steady-
state sound compared to quiet and this relatively large effect of the mere presence of sound 
(i.e., regardless of whether it was changing or not) was found on both the probe and missing-
item task. Thus, the greater susceptibility of children to auditory distraction appears to be 
attributable to their greater tendency to disengage from the focal task in the presence of any 
sound and regardless of the qualitative nature of the focal task.      
 Also consistent with an attentional capture account of the increased susceptibility of 
children compared to adults is that the former have a relatively low WMC (and hence lower 
attentional control; Cowan et al., 2005). Thus, their distractibility may be analagous 
functionally to that of adults with very low WMC.   However, apparently at odds with this 
hypothesis is that individual differences in WMC within child-participant samples does not 
correlate with their distractibility (e.g., Elliott & Briganti, 2012). One possible explanation 
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for this is that the measures taken of distractibility have not isolated the proportion of 
disruption attributable to attentional capture (which should correlate with WMC) and that 
attributable to the changing-state effect (for which there are individual differences but ones 
that do not correlate with WMC; see Macken et al., 2009). Thus, it is possible that individual 
differences in the changing-state effect obscure an actual relationship between WMC and 
individual differences in distraction produced by attentional capture. It would seem 
worthwhile, therefore, to try to partition the variability accounted for by the two forms of 
distraction in future individual-differences based studies of auditory distraction.  
Summary and Conclusions 
 In this paper, evidence has been reviewed suggesting that distraction of cognitive 
performance by sound takes two functionally distinct forms. Interference-by-process—
illustrated here through the changing-state effect in serial recall—occurs when the processing 
of the sound competes specifically for the control of a particular process (serial rehearsal) 
involved in the focal task. Accordingly, whilst greater engagement in serial rehearsal 
increases this form of distraction, greater engagement in task-processing unrelated to serial 
rehearsal (due to high encoding-difficulty or preparing for distraction in light of 
foreknowledge of potential distraction) has no effect. Individual differences in the capacity to 
prioritize task-relevant over task-irrelevant processing are also unrelated to interference-by-
process. In contrast, auditory attentional capture occurs whenever the sound causes a 
disengagement away from the focal task, regardless of the qualitative nature of that task. 
Whilst many types of sound may potentially cause specific attentional capture, interest has 
centred here on aspecific attentional capture caused by a deviation from the prevailing sound-
sequence. A body of work from a variety of task-settings suggests that attentional capture can 
indeed be resisted via greater engagement in processing unrelated to the sound, at least by 
those individuals deemed to be high in working memory capacity. In light of such evidence 
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for a distinction between two forms of auditory distraction—one controllable by the 
individual, the other less so, if at all—it is important in future research that efforts are made 
to systematically isolate their possible individual contributions to the overall disruption of 
task performance.  
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